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The	‘exit	index’:	how	likely	are	other	countries	to
follow	in	the	UK’s	footsteps?
Ever	since	the	United	Kingdom	decided	to	leave	the	European	Union	in	June	2016,	one	question	has	been	on	the
minds	of	many	Europeans:	which	other	member	states	could	leave	the	EU	in	the	years	ahead?	In	fact,	one
argument	among	Brexiteers	in	the	run-up	to	the	referendum	was	that	the	UK	needs	to	break	free	from	the	EU	as	a
’failing	political	project’,	a	mantra	repeated	by	Leave	supporters	to	this	day.	But	how	likely	is	it	that	the	EU	will	fail?
In	a	recent	paper,	I	argue	that	there	are	essentially	two	scenarios	in	which	the	EU	could	collapse.	The	first	entails
all	EU	member	states	agreeing	–	unanimously	–	to	change	the	Treaties	and	dissolve	the	EU.	This	is,	perhaps	self-
evidently,	never	going	to	happen	since	there	will	always	be	states	opposing	this	course	of	action	(e.g.	Luxembourg).
The	second	scenario	is	the	EU	being	hollowed	out	by	successive	–	but	individual	–	exits	of	member	states,	which
each	state	can	decide	on	a	sovereign	basis	within	its	own	domestic	political	arena.
This	second	option	cannot	be	discarded	out	of	hand.	The	UK	’successfully’	leaving	the	EU	will	demonstrate	that	it	is
just	that	–	an	option	for	member	states.	In	fact,	many	states	have	already	been	linked	to	future	exits,	as	this	picture
brilliantly	summarises.	To	get	a	better	understanding	of	how	much	of	a	threat	this	really	is	for	the	EU,	I	develop	an
’exit	index’	to	measure	each	member	state’s	propensity	to	leave	the	EU.
The	approach	underpinning	the	exit	index	is	simple.	I	look	for	indicators	in	the	social,	economic,	and	political
dimensions	that	help	us	develop	a	better	sense	of	how	likely	future	exits	are.	For	example,	in	the	social	dimension,
it	seems	clear	that	the	greater	the	share	of	citizens	having	only	a	national	(and	no	European)	identity,	the	more
plausible	an	exit	scenario	is.	Economically,	the	share	of	exports	going	to	other	EU	member	states	(and	thus	the
value	of	membership	of	the	single	market)	promises	to	be	a	good	indicator.	Politically,	the	share	of	Eurosceptic
MPs	goes,	among	other	factors,	into	the	exit	index.
My	findings	can	be	summarised	in	two	figures.	Figure	1	shows	the	situation	before	the	Brexit	referendum	(so
around	2016).	As	can	be	seen	in	the	table	on	the	right,	the	UK	really	was	uniquely	positioned	to	leave	the	EU.	It
was	also	the	only	country	ranking	in	the	top	three	in	each	dimension	individually.	If	we	understand	these
dimensions	as	necessary	conditions,	where	countries	only	leave	the	EU	if	‘doing	well’	across	all	three,	no	other
member	state	faces	a	comparable	risk	of	leaving	the	EU.
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The	exit	index	also	allows	us	to	define	’cores	of	Europe’.	Core	1	states	are	extremely	unlikely	to	leave	the	EU.	Note,
for	example,	that	Ireland	clearly	falls	into	that	category.	Core	2	states	are	very	unlikely	to	leave,	but	more	likely	than
core	1	states.	France	and	Germany,	for	example,	belong	to	this	core.	Core	3	states	are	most	susceptible	to	a	leave
vote.	Unsurprisingly,	Greece	and	Italy	can	be	found	in	this	core.	However,	even	in	core	3	the	default	expectation
remains	EU	membership	for	all	states	but	the	UK.
Figure	1.	Exit	propensities	before	the	UK’s	EU	referendum
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Figure	2	shows	how	the	situation	has	changed	since	the	referendum.	These	numbers	also	’simulate’	Brexit	by
excluding	the	UK	from	intra-EU	export	figures.	Overall,	the	EU	has	moved	closer	together.	The	only	country	really
edging	closer	to	an	exit	scenario	in	the	past	three	years	has	been	Italy.	However,	only	39	per	cent	of	Italians	lack	a
European	identity.	For	comparison,	the	UK	hit	a	whopping	63	per	cent	before	the	(narrowly	won)	referendum.
Moreover,	Italy	would	face	massive	economic	adjustment	costs	from	leaving	the	Eurozone.
Figure	2.	Exit	propensities	after	the	UK’s	EU	referendum
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Importantly,	Germany	is	far	from	abandoning	the	European	project.	Given	its	size	and	geographic	centrality,	it	can
be	viewed	as	the	linchpin	of	European	integration.	As	long	as	Germany	remains	in	the	EU,	it	seems	unlikely	that
other	member	states	will	see	their	national	interests	served	by	cutting	ties	to	Brussels	(and	thus,	to	a	significant
extent,	also	Germany).	France	is	somewhat	more	susceptible	to	an	exit	scenario,	but	the	French	also	have	a	rather
pronounced	European	identity	and	would	face	great	difficulties	in	abandoning	the	euro.	With	France	and	Germany
all	but	assured	to	stay	in	the	EU,	it	is	hard	to	imagine	a	plausible	scenario	where	many	(if	any)	member	states
would	prefer	to	leave.
It	is	also	interesting	to	note	that	the	situation	in	the	UK	itself	has	changed	significantly	since	the	referendum.	With
51	per	cent,	a	slight	majority	of	its	citizens	feel	partly	European	today	(compared	to	only	37	per	cent	before	the
referendum).	Also,	immigration	from	other	EU	member	states	is	viewed	in	a	more	positive	light.	Today,	70	per	cent
feel	positively	about	EU	immigrants	(compared	to	only	53	per	cent	around	2016).	What	is	surprising	then	is	that	the
share	of	respondents	seeing	a	better	future	for	the	UK	outside	the	EU	has	even	increased	slightly.	One	way	to
interpret	this	disconnect	is	that	the	British	do	see	a	better	future	outside	the	EU	not	because	of	issues	connected	to
the	EU	itself	anymore,	but	to	finally	put	an	end	to	the	domestic	political	battle	that	has	ravaged	the	country	ever
since	the	Brexit	referendum	has	taken	place.
All	in	all,	the	EU	is	in	–	perhaps	surprisingly	–	good	shape	with	few	indications	of	other	member	states	following	the
UK’s	example	and	trading	EU	membership	for	a	more	than	uncertain	future.	If	anything,	the	political	and	social
fallout	after	the	Brexit	referendum	had	the	opposite	effect	and	brought	the	remaining	EU	member	states	closer
together.	Describing	the	EU	as	a	’failing’	political	project,	therefore,	is	a	serious	mischaracterisation.	This	also
underlines	that	the	UK	will	need	to	define	a	future	relationship	with	the	EU	as	a	whole	in	phase	two	of	the
negotiations,	which	will	begin	after	the	UK	has	ratified	the	withdrawal	agreement	and	formally	left	the	EU.
While	it	is	perfectly	understandable	that	people	across	the	UK	suffer	from	‘Brexit	fatigue’	and	want	to	‘get	Brexit
done’,	the	sad	truth	is	that	Brexit	will	remain	a	major	topic	–	on	both	sides	of	the	Channel	–	for	years	to	come.	The
most	important	thing	is	that,	during	this	long	period	of	hard	bargaining	among	neighbours,	everyone	in	the	UK	and
all	across	the	EU	remembers	that	there	will	always	be	so	many	more	things	that	unite	than	divide	us.	An	adversarial
relationship	based	on	loose	ties	serves	no	one	in	the	long	term.
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This	blog	post	appeared	originally	on	LSE	Brexit.	It	is	based	on	Brexit!	Grexit?	Frexit?	Considerations	on	how
to	explain	and	measure	the	propensities	of	member	states	to	leave	the	European	Union,	EUI	Working
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